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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

WILFRED A. VIGIL, JR.,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900166

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an interlocutory appeal by defendant in a
prosecution for second degree murder, a first degree felony,
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a)-(c) (1990), and attempted
second degree murder, a second degree felony, under Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-5-203(l)(a)-(c) and 76-4-101 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial
court correctly ruled that defendant could be prosecuted for
attempted second degree murder under the depraved indifference
alternative defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c) (1990).
Because this presents a question of law, a "correction
of error" standard of review applies.
1

City of Monticello v.

Christensen. 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. Ill S. Ct.
120 (1990); Provo City Corporation v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456
(Utah 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented on
appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Wifred A. Vigil, Jr., was charged with one
count of second degree murder, a first degree felony, under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a)-(c) (1990), and two counts of
attempted second degree murder, a second degree felony, under
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203(1)(a)-(c) and 76-4-101 (1990) (R. 68).
Defendant moved to dismiss the attempted second degree
murder counts that were based on the depraved indifference
alternative defined in section 76-5-203(1)(c) (R. 42-43).

The

trial court denied defendant's motion.
Defendant filed a petition for permission to appeal
under rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code
Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(c) (Supp. 1989) (repealed effective July 1,
1990J1, requesting review of the trial court's denial of the
motion to dismiss (R. 87-93).

This Court granted the petition.

1

A criminal defendant's right to appeal an interlocutory
order is now contained in Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(c) (Supp.
1990).
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of this appeal, a statement of facts much
beyond those set forth in the Statement of the Case is not
necessary.

The only additional fact that may serve to put the

issue presented into perspective is that the charges against
defendant arose out of his shooting a rifle into a crowd, killing
one person and wounding two others (see Information, R. 8;
Plaintiff's Memorandum at 3, R. 65).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under Utah's attempt and second degree murder statutes,
defendant can be prosecuted for attempted murder based upon the
depraved indifference alternative.

This conclusion is consistent

with the Model Penal Code's definition of attempt, upon which
Utah's attempt statute is based, and this Court's construction of
the depraved indifference murder statute.
ARGUMENT
UNDER UTAH'S ATTEMPT AND SECOND DEGREE MURDER
STATUTES, DEFENDANT CAN BE PROSECUTED FOR
ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE MURDER BASED ON THE
DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE ALTERNATIVE.
Defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly ruled
that he could be prosecuted for attempted murder under the
depraved indifference second degree murder alternative defined in
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (c) (1990)2.
2

Citing a number of

Section 76-5-203(1)(c) provides:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in
the second degree if the actor:
. . .

(c) acting under circumstances
3

decisions of this Court in homicide cases and referring to the
language of the attempt statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101
(1990)3, he presents a straightforward argument that attempted
murder requires an intent to kill, a mental state he correctly
asserts is not an element of the depraved indifference
alternative.

Although the Utah cases relied upon by defendant—

none of which addresses the precise issue presented in this
case—could be read to suggest that the crime of attempted
depraved indifference murder does not exist in Utah, a close
reading of those cases, coupled with an examination of the Model
Penal Code provision upon which Utah's attempt statute is based,
leads to the conclusion that such a crime does exist.
As noted by defendant, in State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d
1042 (Utah 1984), this Court interpreted section 76-5-203(1)(c)
to require proof of the following elements:

evidencing a depraved indifference
to human life, he [sic] engages in
conduct which creates a grave risk
of death to another and thereby
causes the death of another[.]
3

Section 76-4-101 provides in pertinent part:
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an
attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of
culpability otherwise required for the commission of
the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a
substantial step toward commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not
constitute a substantial step unless it is strongly
corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the
offense.
4

1. The defendant engaged in conduct that
created a grave risk of death to another; and
2. At the time he so acted, the defendant
knew that his conduct created a grave risk of
death to another; and
3. The circumstances under which the
defendant acted, objectively viewed by a
reasonable man rather than subjectively by
the actual state of defendant's mindf were
such as to evidence a depraved indifference
to human life; and
4. The defendant thereby unlawfully caused
the death of another.
680 P.2d at 1047. Critical to the issue presented in this case
is the Court's conclusion that the statute requires that "the
defendant acted with knowledge
risk of death to another."
added).

that his conduct created a grave

Ibid, (footnote omitted) (emphasis

The Fontana Court made clear that the knowledge element

for subsection (l)(c) differs from the knowledge element for
subsection (l)(a)A only in degree:
The "knowingly" requirement of subsection
(a) specifies a prospect of death approaching
certainty ("reasonably certain to cause"),
but this subsection focuses on the
prospective death of a particular person—the
one whose death was actually caused. In
contrast, subsection (c) is satisfied by a
"grave risk" of death, but this subsection
can refer to the risk defendant's conduct

4

Section 76-5-203(1)(a) provides:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in
the second degree if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly
causes the death of another[.]
5

imposes on people generally, not just on the person
whose death is actually caused.
Ibid, (citation omitted).
In State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988), the
Court further refined the definition of depraved indifference
murder, holding that "grave risk of death" as used in section 765-203(1) (c) "means a highly

likely

probability

that death will

result from a risk that the defendant knowingly creates." Jlci. at
264 (emphasis in original)5.

And, Standiford reaffirmed the

view expressed in State v. Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d 1214, 1220 (Utah
1985), that the mens rea of depraved indifference murder (i.e.,
knowledge of a grave risk of death) is "'equivalent
'specific intent' [or a purpose] to kill.'"

to a

.Id. at 261 (quoting

Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d at 1220) (brackets and emphasis in original).
With the foregoing principles in mind, the central
issue of whether the crime of depraved indifference murder exists
in Utah can now be examined.

In State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390

(Utah 1989), this Court made clear that simply because one can be
convicted of second degree murder under one of the four
alternatives defined in sections 76-5-203(1)(a)-(d), that does
not necessarily mean that a conviction of attempted murder is
also possible for each alternative.

5

There, the Court held that

This refinement distinguishes depraved indifference murder
from reckless manslaughter and the "substantial and unjustifiable
risk" of death associated with that crime. 769 P.2d at 264. In
short, "[t]his standard is less than what is required for an
intentional or knowing murder, but greater than what is required
for reckless manslaughter." Ibid.

6

attempted felony murder (section 76-5-203(1)(d)) does not exist
in Utah because "the crime of attempted murder requires proof of
intent to kill."

785 P.2d at 394. Defendant relies heavily on

the quoted language as support for his argument that the crime of
attempted depraved indifference murder does not exist in Utah.
However, defendant reads too much into that language, failing to
consider it in the context of the narrow issue presented in Bell
and ignoring the concept that the mens rea of depraved
indifference is equivalent to an intent or purpose to kill,
Standiford, 769 P.2d at 261. Defendant's argument also fails to
consider the philosophy that underpins the Model Penal Code's
attempt provision, from which Utah's attempt statute is derived.
In Bell, the sole issue before the Court was whether
one could be convicted of attempted felony murder under Utah's
second degree murder statute; the depraved indifference
alternative was not considered.

In holding that attempted felony

murder does not exist in Utah, the Court emphasized that felony
murder, insofar as the homicide is concerned, does not require
proof of any culpable mental state.

785 P.2d at 393-94.

Thus,

felony murder is a distinctly different crime from depraved
indifference murder, which requires proof of a highly culpable
mental state.

Standiford, 769 P.2d at 259 (subsections (l)(a)

through (c) "are comparable to the old malice aforethought").
Accordingly, the Court's seemingly broad statement in Bell that
attempted murder requires proof of intent to kill is most

7

reasonably read as a recognition that attempted murder requires
an intent to kill or a mental state that is equivalent thereto.
Utah's attempt statute, section 76-4-101, is derived
from the Model Penal Code.

State v. Pearson, 680 P.2d 406, 408

(Utah 1984) (per curiam); Model Penal Code, art. 5, § 5.01 (1985)
(hereafter "MPC")6.

A comment to MPC § 5.01 gives the following

illustration of attempted murders
Subsection (l)(b) [of § 5.01] provides
that when causing a particular result is an
element of the crime, as in homicide cases .
. ., an actor commits an attempt when he does
or omits to do anything with the purpose of
causing "or with the belief that it will
cause" such result without further conduct on
his part. Thus, a belief that death will
ensue from the actor's conduct . . . will
6

Section 5.01 provides in pertinent part:(1) Definition of Attempt. A person is
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise
required for commission of the crime, he
(a) purposely engages in conduct that would
constitute the crime if the attendant
circumstances were as he believes them to be;
or
(b) when causing a particular
result is an element of the crime,
does or omits to do anything with
the purpose of causing or with the
belief that it will cause such
result without further conduct on
his part; or
(c) purposely does or omits to do
anything that, under the
circumstances as he believes them
to be, is an act or omission
constituting a substantial step in
a course of conduct planned to
culminate in his commission of the
crime.

8

suffice, as would a purpose to bring about
those results. If, for example, the actor's
purpose were to demolish a building and,
knowing that persons were in the building and
they would be killed by the explosion, he
nevertheless detonated a bomb that turned out
to be defective, he could be prosecuted for
attempted murder even though it was no part
of his purpose that the inhabitants of the
building would be killed.
It is difficult to say what the decision
would be under prevailing attempt principles
in a case of this kind. It might be held
that the actor did not specifically intend to
kill the inhabitants of the building; on the
other hand, the concept of "intent" has
always been an ambiguous one and might be
thought to include results that the actor
believed to be the inevitable consequence of
his conduct. In any event, the inclusion of
such conduct as the basis for liability under
Subsection (l)(b) is based on the conclusion
that the manifestation of the actor's
dangerousness is just as great—or very
nearly as great—as in the case of purposive
conduct. In both instances a deliberate
choice is made to bring about the consequence
forbidden by the criminal laws, and the actor
has done all within his power to cause this
result to occur. The absence of any desire
that the result occur is not, under the
circumstances, a sufficient basis for
differentiating between the two types of
conduct involved. . . .
MPC, art. 5, § 5.01 comment 2, at 304-05. Although this comment
points out that "[o]nly a minority of recent revisions have
explicitly

followed the Model Code on this point," .id. at 305

(emphasis added), the comment's example of attempted murder where
there is no actual intent to kill, but rather a mental state of
equivalent dangerousness (i.e., knowledge or belief that death
will occur), fits well with this Court's concept that the mens
rea for depraved indifference is equivalent to an intent or
9

purpose to kill.

Indeed, the facts of the instant case, where

defendant shot a rifle into a crowd, closely parallel the example
given•
The courts are split as to whether the offense of
attempted murder requires an intent to kill.

Some courts have

held that attempted murder can exist only when there is an intent
to kill; some lesser mental state, including a "knowing" mental
state, is not sufficient.

E.g. State v. Huff, 469 A.2d 1251,

1252-53 (Me. 1984)7; State v. Mitchell, 98 Ill.App.3d 398, 53
7

The Huff case, which defendant relies on and which was
relied on by this Court in State v. Bell, 785 P.2d at 393,
construes an attempt statute which, although similar to Utah's,
contains a significant phrase that does not appear in the Utah
statute. Under Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 152(1) (1983),
"[a] person is guilty of criminal attempt if, acting with the
kind of culpability required for the commission of the crime, and

with the intent

to complete

the commission of the crime, he

engages in conduct which, in fact, constitutes a substantial step
toward its commission" (emphasis added). The italicized
language, which does not appear in Utah's attempt statute, was
critical to the Huff court's conclusion that attempted murder
necessarily requires an intent to kill:
Under . . . § 152(1), a person is guilty
of criminal attempt if he acts with intent
to

complete

the commission of the

target

offense.
Where a discrepancy exists in the
culpable mental states between criminal
attempt and the offense attempted, the
criminal attempt to commit such a crime is a
"logical impossibility." . . . Thus, . . .
[a]n actor . . . cannot intend to act . . .
"knowingly".
469 A.2d at 1253 (emphasis added). Neither the Bell Court nor
defendant notes this important distinction between the Maine and
Utah attempt statutes.
While it might be argued that the "intent" language of
Maine's statute is essentially the same as that which appears in
subsection (2) of section 76-4-101 ("For purposes of this part,
conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is
10

111.Dec. 867, 424 N.E.2d 658, 661 (1981).

Other courts have held

that attempted murder can be committed with an intentional or
knowing mental state.

E.g. Gelabert v. State, 712 S.W.2d 813,

817-18 (Tex. App. 1986); Gentry v. State, 437 So.2d 1097, 1098-99
(Fla. 1983).

A similar split exists on the specific issue of

whether the crime of attempted depraved indifference murder
exists.

Compare State v. Johnson. 103 N.M. 364, 707 P.2d 1174,

1177-79 (N.M. App.) (crime of attempted "depraved mind" murder
does not exist), cert, quashed, 103 N.M. 344, 707 P.2d 552 (N.M.
1985); with People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 937-38 (Colo. 1983)
(en banc) (crime of attempted "extreme indifference" murder does
exist).

Although admittedly a difficult question, the better

view, and the one most consistent with the Model Penal Code and
this Court's conclusion that the mens rea for depraved
indifference murder is equivalent to an intent to kill, is that
the crime of attempted depraved indifference murder exists in
Utah8.

Such a conclusion implements the clear bias in modern

criminal jurisprudence "toward punishing an actor's [culpable
strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the
offense."), Maine's statute contains the subsection (2) language
in addition to the "intent" language that has been discussed.
See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 152(1). Therefore, taken in
context, the subsection (2) language can be read less
restrictively than the Maine statute, and reasonably be
interpreted to refer to conduct that is strongly corroborative of
an intentional mental state or one equivalent thereto.
8

This Court's characterization of the depraved indifference
mens rea as being equivalent to an intent to kill is what
distinguishes the instant case from State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237
(Utah 1978), which held that there cannot be an attempt to commit
manslaughter under the reckless homicide alternative of that
crime, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1)(a) (1990). Recklessness
cannot be equated with an intent to kill. Norman, 580 P.2d at
239-40.
11

mental state] instead of simply punishing the manifest
criminality or outwardly criminal act."
P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah 1989).

State v. Pappas, 705

As recognized by this Court, the

legislature has sought "to punish subjective criminality so long
as it is linked with some . . . corroborative act that
demonstrates the firmness of the actor's criminal resolve."
Ibid.
This Court should follow the reasoning of Castro, where
the Colorado Supreme Court, construing an attempt statute nearly
identical to Utah's and an "extreme indifference" murder statute
very similar to section 76-5-203(1)(c)9, recognized that one
could attempt "extreme indifference" murder because that crime,
"while not requiring a conscious object to kill, necessitates a
conscious object to engage in conduct that creates a grave risk
of death to another."

657 P.2d at 938. Noting that "[t]he crime

of extreme indifference murder requires an intentional state of
mind with respect to proscribed conduct[,] [in that] [t]he actor
must be aware of his conduct and have a conscious object to
engage in it," the court rejected "the defendant's assertion that
the crime of extreme indifference murder requires an intent to
commit an unintentional act." Id. at 938. ££. State v. Johnson,
707 P.2d at 1178 ("Thus, an attempt to commit [depraved mind
murder] would seem to require proof that a defendant intended
perpetrate an unintentional

killing—which is logically

9

See Castro, 657 P.2d at 937 (setting forth elements of
attempt and extreme indifference murder).
12

to

impossible." (brackets and emphasis in original)).

Where a

highly culpable mental state is present, indeed one that is
equivalent to an intent to kill, there appears to be no good
reason to preclude an attempted murder conviction—the only fact
separating the defendant from a murder conviction being the
fortuity that a death did not occur.

See Gentry v. State, 437

So.2d at 1099.
In sum, the trial court correctly ruled that defendant
could be prosecuted for attempted second degree murder under the
depraved indifference alternative.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing argument, this Court should
affirm the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to
dismiss and remand the case for trial on the charges as filed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J^J^day of April, 1991.
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Attorney General
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